Rigorous caution in TS
research
Daniel Gile
One of the very
fundamental norms of ESP is caution. Being aware of sensory and cognitive
limitations of humans and of the high risk of their perception being distorted by
personal bias, the ‘Scientific Method’ insists on caution, in particular when
reporting facts, when interpreting phenomena and when making inferences.
There seems to be a substantial difference
between ESP and LAP norms with respect to interpreting phenomena and making
inferences: in ESP, when phenomena are interpreted (for instance a translator’s
particular behaviour), the rule is not only to try to use all available
evidence to generate the interpretation, but also to indicate what the evidence
is, and above all to show clearly when the interpretation is speculative and
when a claim is made; in LAP, this is apparently not the case (judging by the
fact that peers do not react when authors do not comply with this norm), and
after interpretation, assertions are often made with little restraint.
Similarly, in ESP, inferences are explicit and generally do not venture much
beyond what the evidence points to as virtually the only logical conclusion
which can be drawn from the facts – except when explanatory hypotheses are
offered, in which case their speculative nature is made clear; in LAP,
intuitive inferences rather than inferences constrained by the evidence and by
strict adherence to Aristotelian logic seem to be acceptable.
However, when reporting facts, caution should
apply equally to both paradigms; it is difficult to see an advantage in
reporting facts incorrectly no matter what kind of research approach is adopted.
In particular, there is no reason why authors from either ESP or LAP should say
that a hypothesis has been ‘proved’ if only some evidence supporting it has
been offered but there is still room for doubt; or why they should say that
something has been shown ‘about translators’ if it has only been shown about
translation students, or why they should write that an author has expressed a
certain idea if s/he has only written something compatible with that idea (but
perhaps with different ideas as well). In TS literature there are still many
cases where this norm of rigorous reporting of facts is broken, both in texts
reporting on empirical research and in LAP publications.
Being rigorous in research is a norm. It is
also an attitude and a form of self-discipline. But how does one become
rigorous? Some TS scholars may have a ‘naturally’ rigorous personality. Some have
acquired rigorous working habits when studying disciplines such as law or
mathematics. Others need to be trained. In some established empirical
disciplines, this is part of hands-on training in research methods (it is
through numerous corrections that one is socialized into appropriate habits). In
other disciplines, it is up to supervisors to instil in their supervisees
rigorous practices by commenting on any deviations from the norm. When such
supervisors are not available, referees and other evaluators can help by
pointing out weaknesses in manuscripts submitted for publication. But this
requires awareness, dedication and some courage.